Abstract: This paper uses a new data set to study household responses to adverse income shocks in seven Latin American countries. The results show (i) that households respond to income shocks mainly by increasing their labor force participation, selling assets, and disinvesting in human capital, (ii) that poor households are most likely to be affected by adverse income shocks, and (iii) that lower-middle class households are more likely to cut back human capital investments and migrate abroad in the face of an adverse income shock. Taken together, these results offer ample justification to publicly funded safety nets targeted to the poor.
Introduction
Macroeconomic volatility is a fact of life in Latin America, and a puzzling one at that.
While booms and busts come and go, analysts keep changing their theories and their prescriptions. But whereas there is little agreement about the causes of volatility, there is some agreement about its effects. During crisis, poverty and inequality surge, and educational, health and nutritional indicators deteriorate, especially among the poor.
Besides, these effects are often permanent in that they are not easily undone when income levels rise again. 1 This paper uses a new data set to study household responses to adverse income shocks in seven Latin American countries. Our main goal is to study the extent to which households respond to adverse income shocks by cutting back human capital investments, selling productive physical assets or reacting in any other way that can adversely affect future outcomes. In addition, we investigate the extent to which adverse income shocks affect households from different socioeconomic strata, as well as the difference between rich and poor households in their responses to crisis. By doing this, we hope to provide some clues as to why crises can permanently affect social indicators, and ultimately to shed some light on policies aimed at reducing the deleterious effects of crises.
The data set used in this paper was especially designed to measure household responses to crises This data set relies on a set of retrospective questions about socioeconomic outcomes before and during the crisis of 1999 to circumvent the lack of longitudinal data that have hindered most previous attempts to investigate the effects of an economic downturn on the fortunes of households. 2 The data, however, has only qualitative information. We know, for example, whether or not a given household experienced a substantial reduction of its income in the face of the crisis, but we don't the magnitude of 1 See, for example, the evidence presented by Lustig (2000) . 2 For the seven countries under analysis, GDP fell 1.5% during 1999. The contraction was especially accentuated in the Andean countries: over 4 in Colombia and over 6% in Ecuador and Venezuela. these events. In any case, the data at hand provide a unique glimpse to household response to adverse income shocks.
We find that households respond to adverse income shocks mainly by selling assets and disinvesting in human capital. Presumably both strategies are inefficient in that household would have acted differently had we they had access to traditional smoothing mechanisms. Moreover, both strategies may have large negative effects upon the life prospects of those involved. We also find that poorer households are not only more liable to experience adverse income socks during crisis, but also more likely to respond by disinvesting in human capital. Taken together, these results offer ample justification to publicly funded safety nets targeted to the poor.
Motivation
Crises are times of turmoil for households. During crises some households reduce their consumption or sell luxury goods, while others migrate abroad or cut back their human capital investments. While some of these adjustments are of little consequence, others may have huge long-term effects upon the socioeconomic outcomes of those involved.
Thus, those who dropped out of school in the face of an in come shock substantially reduce their socioeconomic prospects. Equally, those who migrate often have to cope with the sudden depreciation of a large part of their human capital. Figure 1 summarizes the main lines of inquiry of this paper. First, we want to study the various ways in which families react to adverse income shocks, focusing on a few prominent "coping" strategies: increases in labor force participation, sales of physical assets and migration. Second, we want to study the extent to which adverse income shocks are associated with welfare losses, focusing on the role of savings and credit to shield households from temporary drops in their current incomes.
Our analysis will shed light on the three important issues: (i) the relative importance of the different household strategies under consideration (section 4), (ii) the role of savings and credit in protecting households from steep consumption drops (section 5), and (iii) the differences among socioeconomic groups in the way their cope with income shocks (section 6). As mentioned above, our analysis seeks to understand household behavior during crises and ultimately to guide the design of safety nets and public assistance programs, in general.
There have been a few recent studies looking at household responses to income shocks during economic downturns. Cunninghame and Mallony (2000) uses longitudinal data to study the changing fortunes of a bunch of Mexican families before, during and after the crisis of 1994-95, concluding that poorer families were better able to cope with the crisis owing mainly to their greater ability to increase their labor supply in the face of an income shock. Gaviria (2000) , for his part, uses a dataset similar to the one used in this paper to study who suffered the most during the Colombian crisis of 1999, concluding that the poor were not only most likely to lose income and reduce consumption, but also appear to have less flexibility to respond to income shocks. It remains unclear, however, whether the seemingly opposite conclusions of these studies are due to differences between the countries and episodes under consideration or to differences in the data and the methodologies used.
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In more general terms, Lustig (2000) argues vehemently that economic downturns often cause poor households to disinvest and reduce their assets, including their human capital.
In her view, crises do have deleterious long-term consequences upon the fortunes of the poor, which gives ample justification to publicly funded safety nets aimed at shielding poor (and perhaps middle class households as well) from adverse income shocks. The relevance of these policies, as well as the validity of the facts that justify them, is the main topic of this paper. 
Data Description
This paper uses a new set of surveys to study household responses to income shocks in Latin America. These surveys were designed specifically for this purpose by a team of researchers from the Inter-American Development Bank, and were carried out during the first semester of 2000 in seven Latin American countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela. Samples are representative of the urban populations of the countries under analysis, and comprise approximately 1000 households in each country
By and large, the questionnaire includes three types of questions. The first type refers to the specific nature of the income shocks endured by the households (e.g., whether a member lost his job or a family business went broke). The second refers to the reactions of the households to the purported income shocks (e.g., whether a member entered the labor market or physical assets were sold). And the third refers to socioeconomic characteristics of the households (e.g., schooling of the head and dwelling characteristics).
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We assume throughout that a household experienced an income shock if at least one of the following events took place: (i) a member lost his job, (ii) a member experienced a substantial drop in his earnings, (iii) a family business went broke, and (iv) a family business experienced a substantial drop in its revenue. Table 1 shows that almost 45% of the households reported the occurrence of at least one of these events in 1999: 30%
reported that at least one member was laid off during 1999 and 15% that they owned a business that had to shut down during the same period.
We assume that a household experienced a drop in consumption if each one of the following events took place: (i) a household member stopped buying non-essential goods,
(ii) a member tried to by buy cheaper or lower quality goods, (iii) a member reduced its spending on entertainment, and (iv) a member postponed the acquisition of durable goods. Although this definition is quite restrictive and may well leave out some households that did experience consumption drops, laxer definitions yielded 5 The codebook of the survey is available in the internet at unreasonably large fractions of households experiencing consumption losses, which may reflect the willingness of people to complain indiscriminately in times of criseis. Despite the stringent conditions, 28% of the households interviewed experienced a consumption loss according to our definition. Ecuador and only 10% in Honduras. The fraction of households reporting that at least one member entered the labor market was the highest in Ecuador, as was the fraction of households reporting that at least one member had to drop out of school. Honduras had the largest fraction of households reporting more hours worked by the head, Colombia the largest fraction reporting the sale of assets, and Ecuador the largest fraction reporting the migration abroad of at least one of its members.
In general, the extent of household reactions is positively correlated to the extent of income shocks at the country level. All in all, countries where a larger fraction of households report losing income are also countries where a larger fraction of households report increasing their labor force participation (or having members who dropped out of school, for that matter). Also, the fraction of households reporting consumption drops and the growth rates of GDP in 1999 are negatively correlated at the country level: the correlation coefficient is above 0.5 and significant at the standard levels. Although the subsequent analysis will abstract away from cross-country differences, focusing mainly on the relationship between income shocks and household reactions at the household level, it is comforting to notice that cross-country differences show consistent patterns of variation.
Are the rich less vulnerable?
The data at hand permits to examine how the probabilities of losing income and of reducing consumption vary with the socioeconomic status of a household. Because households that lost income are more likely to appear in the lower ends of the income distribution, this probability will be, by construction, higher among the poorest households. It would erroneous, however, to conclude from this evidence that poor households are more likely to experience income losses, as this association is merely In this paper, we use an alternative indicator based on household possessions of durable goods and dwelling characteristics. Specifically, we use the information listed on note 6
to rank households according to their socioeconomic status and to construct quintiles of socioeconomic status. 6 Our approach involves three main steps. First, we use Principal
Components to compute a weighted average of the relevant household attributes, then we rank all households on the basis of this average, and last we use the ranking to compute quintiles of socioeconomic status. 7 The quintiles can be interpreted as reflecting the longterm position of the households in terms of socioeconomic status--an interpretation 6 The household assets and dwelling characteristics used to measure socioeconomic status were: access to drinkable water and sewage systems, and possessions of telephone, color tv, washing machine, refrigerator, personal computer, car, and a second hose or apartment. 7 Principal Components are often used to approximate socioeconomic status in the absence of reliable income data. Filmer and Pritchett (1998) show that durable goods and housing attributes are observed with much more precision than consumption expenditures, and that indicators of socioeconomic status based on these variables are much less sensitive to temporary disturbances on household welfare than similar indicators based on consumption data.
supported by the fact that the average schooling of the household head increases monotonically as one moves from the lower to the upper quintiles.
8 Figure 2 shows that the probability of losing income is lower in the upper quintiles than in the lower ones, and that the differences between poor are middle class households are in general puny. 9 The same figure shows that a similar pattern holds for the probability of reducing consumption, which underlines the fact that rich households tend to be less vulnerable. The higher vulnerability of the poor is exacerbated by the fact that income downturns can have a more devastating effect on those living close to subsistence.
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Various mechanisms can explain the relatively higher vulnerability of poorer households.
Poor unskilled workers not only tend to work in more volatile sectors (construction is a case in point), but are also disproportionately represented in the informal sector, which is also more responsive to macroeconomic fluctuations. In addition, unskilled workers are often the first to be laid-off when firms adjust their production in the face of an economic downturn.
A few recent studies have suggested that the higher probability of poor households to lose income is offset by its higher ability to raise their labor supply in bad times. 11 Even if this is true, and we will return to this point in section 6, it's also true that the rich are more likely to have savings, which allows them to protect their consumption levels. To this respect, figure 3 shows that the fraction of households that report to have savings increases geometrically across quintiles of socioeconomic status. To sum up, the available evidence clearly indicates that rich and middle-income households are less vulnerable, which allows us to answer in the affirmative the question posed above.
On a related point, unreported results show that the schooling of the head doesn't appear to have an effect on vulnerability beyond its effect on the socioeconomic status of the household, which runs counter to the idea that education not only increases the level of income, but reduces the volatility of income as well. Households whose heads are older than 60 or younger than 25 are less likely to lose income and reduce consumption (the relevant probabilities are at least fiver percentage points lower in both cases), which suggests that families tend to be more vulnerable precisely when they are making the key human capital investments.
Main Results
In this section, we study the correlations between the probability of losing income and that of engaging in the various coping strategies listed in figure 1. We first examine these correlations at an aggregate level and then do the same at the household level. Although we will refrain from making strong causality claims, we will argue that the magnitude of the correlations say something about the magnitude of households responses to adverse income shocks. Figure 4 plots the fraction of households that lost income in a given quintile of a given country against the fraction of households that engage in each one the strategies under consideration (quintile numbers are shown in the graph to ease the interpretation).
Overall, we have 35 five observations: five countries and seven quintiles. The idea is to use the variation across countries and quintiles to assess the importance of the five strategies under analysis. Although these correlations may be driven by unobserved country attributes (or by unobserved differences between rich and poor households, for that matter), they provide a useful first pass to the data.
As shown, the probability of losing income is strongly associated with the probability that a household member will enter the labor market: an increase of 10 percentage points in the first is associated with an increase of almost 3 points in the second (a 13% increase over the mean value). The evidence indicates, then, that labor supply at the household level appears to be negatively related to household income--a result usually referred to in the literature as the hypothesis of the added worker.
The connection between the probability of losing income and the probability that a household member will drop out of school is even stronger: an increase of 10 percentage points in the first is related to an increase of more 3 points in the second (a 26% jump over the mean value). Moreover, the fluctuations of the first account for over 60 percent of the fluctuations of the second, pointing to the fact that reductions of household income have a lot to do with the decisions of cutting back in human capital investments. Indeed, reducing these investments appears to be a disturbing consequence of adverse income shocks, confirming the conjectures mentioned in section 2.
Unlike the previous cases, the evidence show that, at least in the aggregate, working longer hours work is not associated with the occurrence of adverse income shocks. If anything, the opposite is true. On average, the lower the fraction of households losing income, the higher the fraction of households in which the head worked longer hours than before. It must be pointed out, however, that this result is likely to be driven by unobserved country characteristics. In Honduras, for example, the very high fraction of households reporting that the head worked longer hours than he used to contrasts with the very small fraction of households reporting that at least one member experienced substantial income losses.
The probabilities of selling household assets and migrating abroad are also positively associated with the probability of losing income. An increase of 10 percentage points in the latter is associated with an increase of one point and one quarter of point in these magnitudes. In both cases, however, the points are less tightly clustered than in the previous figures, suggesting that other forces, which may have little to do with the propensity of losing income, play an important in explaining these outcomes.
As mentioned above, the previous analysis should be interpreted with caution because the results may be driven by unobserved characteristics, not only of countries but of households as well. In what follows, we intend to control as thoroughly as possible for the different sources of unobserved heterogeneity, seeking to better isolate the responses of households to income disturbances.
The analysis is based on the following model
where R is a dummy variable showing whether household i who belongs to quintile q and lives in country c engage in the coping strategy under consideration; S is another dummy showing whether the same household experience a adverse income shock; X is a vector of household attributes, including the age and education of the head; γ and λ are quintile and country fixed effects, respectively; and ε is an error term. We focus mainly on the value of the parameter α, which measures the propensity of households to engage in the strategy under consideration in the face of an adverse income shock: the higher this value, the higher this propensity.
We use a Probit model to estimate Equation (1). Alternative estimation methods yield almost identical results. We estimate equation (1) for each one of the five households strategies under consideration: increases in participation and hours, dropping out of school, sale of assets and migration abroad, and present the results of several alternative specifications in each case. We report marginal effects evaluated at mean values. Table 3 presents the estimation results for increases in labor force participation and dropping out of school, the first two strategies under scrutiny. As shown, households that lost income are much more likely to had member entering the labor market. The coefficient is smaller than that implied by figure 4 but still substantial: an increase of 10 percentage points in the probability of losing income is associated with an increase of 1.5
percentage points in the probability of having a member joining the labor force.
Moreover, this probability goes down as either the education or the age of the household head go up. All else equal, each year of education is associated with a reduction in the probability in question of half of a percentage point.
specification: the value of α is the same in both cases, as are the coefficients attached to the age variables. The same isn't true, however, for the education of the head, whose coefficient goes down and loses significance after quintile effects are introduced, suggesting that education affects the probability of joining the labor force mostly through its effect upon the socioeconomic status of a household.
Table 3 also shows that the probability of having a member leaving school is affected by the probability of losing income: a ten-percentage-point increase in the former is associated with a one-percentage-point increase in the latter. Moreover, the probability in question is related to the age and education of the household head in predictable ways:
households who have older and more educated heads are less likely to have a member dropping out of school. As in the previous case, these results are roughly similar after adding quintile effects to the specification. But unlike the previous case, the education of the head appears to have an effect on the probability of having a member leaving school that is independent of its effect upon the socioeconomic status of the household. This suggests the children of less educated parents are more likely to drop out of school even after we discount the effect of parental education on income levels and income volatility. Figure 5 shows that the fraction of households reporting that at least one member left school during 1999 goes down as one moves from poorer to richer households. The same figure also shows that inter-quintile differences are substantially smaller once we control for the greater propensity of poor households to both lose income and cut back consumption levels. According to the figure, 30% of the differences between the top and bottom quintiles in the probabilities of scaling back human capital investments in a given year can be explained by differences in vulnerability. Presumably, an even larger percentage would be explained had we had controlled for inter-quintile differences in the value of a.
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12 If we allow a to differ among quintiles, differences in vulnerability explain as much as 70% of interquintile differences in the probability of having a member leaving school (see section 6).
The previous results shows, then, that differences in vulnerability explain (i) the bulk of the differences across countries in the fractions of households reporting that at least one member left school, (ii) a large fraction of the differences across quintiles in the same probability, and (iii) a sizable fraction of the intra-quintile differences among households in the probability in question. When taken together, this evidence provides ample justification for policies aimed at preventing households to adjust to adverse income shocks by cutting back their investment in human capital. Such policies will not only have huge implications in terms of equity, but in terms of efficiency as well. Table 4 examines the association between vulnerability and the other household strategies under consideration. The first two columns show that there exists a positive correlation between the probability of losing income and the probability that the household head will work longer hours than before, which indicates that households heads do respond to adverse income shocks by expanding their labor supply-a result that clearly contradicts the evidence presented in figure 4 . This contradiction underlines the perils of using differences among countries to study household reactions, especially when institutional and other factors that affect the relationships under analysis can't be adequately controlled for. All in all, the results of tables 3 and 4 indicate that, to a greater or lesser extent, households resort to all the strategies under consideration to alleviate the short-term effects of adverse income shocks. We can use estimated values of a divided by the mean prevalence of the strategy in question to gauge the relative importance of the different strategies. The idea is to use a "normalized" difference between households who lost income and households who didn't in the probability to engage in a strategy to assess the importance of the strategy. After doing this, we have that the most "important" strategies are: selling assets, reducing human capital investments and increasing labor force participation, in this order. 13 The remainder strategies, expanding one's labor supply and migrating abroad, are still important, but much less common. This ranking suggests that the most common strategies used by households entail actions that, regardless of their short-term effectiveness, have deleterious effects that long outlive the shocks that triggered them.
Income Losses and Consumption Drops
In times of crisis, many households reduce consumption, not only because their disposable income goes down, but also because they adjust downward their income prospects. In this section, we study the interplay between consumption drops and income losses, focusing on the effects of the availability of savings and credit in preventing that adverse income shocks will automatically translate in consumption drops.
It's worth noting first that the probability of losing income explains more than 60% of the variation across countries and quintiles in the probabilities of reducing consumption, suggesting that income and consumption shocks are highly correlated. This result indicates either that many households lack the resources and means to protect themselves against adverse income shocks (e.g., they don't have savings and don't have access to credit) or that they foresee that adverse shocks will affect their income prospects forever (e.g., laid-off workers predict that their employability has decreased and entrepreneurs predict that the competitiveness of their businesses has permanently suffered).
The analysis of this section is based on the following model:
, (2) where subscripts have the same interpretations as before; C is dummy showing whether the household in question reduced its consumption; and R, SAV and CRED are also dummies, showing whether the same household lost income, had savings and received credit during 1999, respectively. We use a Probit model to estimate equation (2) and report marginal effects evaluated at mean values. Table 5 shows that, not surprisingly, households that lost income are much more likely to reduce their consumption levels than households that didn't: the probability of cutting back consumption is at least 10 percentage points higher in the former than in the latter.
There are two alternative ways to interpret this result. One can argue, on the one hand, that income losses often translate into consumption drops by either of two mechanisms mentioned above. But one can alternatively argue that consumption drops are by no means limited to those households who did experience income losses.
Table 5 also shows that household who had savings were much less likely to reduce their consumption than households who didn't. The size of the effect is quite large and does not depend on whether we control for the education of the head or the socioeconomic status of the household. In contrast, household who received credit are marginally more likely to reduce their consumption, which may be a reflection of the fact that the worse hit households resort are more likely to ask for credit in order to ameliorate the effect of the crisis (i.e., there is reverse causality).
The age of the head appears to be consistently related to the probability of reducing consumption levels even after controlling for whether or not a household lost income.
Households whose head is either younger than 25 or older than 60 are less likely to report that they adjust their consumption level downward, which may be linked to the fact that these household are less likely to have children living at home. Finally, the education of the head has only a marginal negative effect on the probability of reducing consumption, and its the effect transmitted mostly through the socioeconomic status of the household (i.e., more educated heads live in richer households which are in turn less likely to reduce consumption).
Do rich and poor households behave differently in times of crisis?
The rich are different from the poor, and not only because they've got more money. Rich and poor households, in particular, respond differently in the face of adverse income shocks. The rich, for example, can often avoid extreme responses such as migrating or cutting back human capital investments, as they not only have better access to incomesmoothing mechanisms, but also are better able to endure an income drop--if only because they are not striving for survival.
where q j is dummy showing whether household i belongs to quintile j (the first quintile is the baseline group), α measures the mean propensity of a household from the first quintile to engage in S, and α+α j measures the same propensity for the j th quintile. The rest of the variables and parameters are the same as before. We use a Probit model to estimate equation (3) and report marginal effects. Figure 6 plots the values α, α+α 2 , α+α 3 , α+α 4 , and α+α 5 against the corresponding quintiles. Mean propensities for all households, taken from tables 3 and 4, are also shown for comparative purposes. Only those differences that are statistically significant are referred to in the discussion that follows. Turning back to Figure 6 , we also find that the propensity of household heads to respond to an adverse income shock by working longer hours is higher among households from the third and fourth quintiles (the differences are not very large and are marginally significant). Although the data offer no clues as to why this is so, one may argue that many poor people, especially in the informal sector, work too many hours already that the have little flexibility to expand their labor supply. The richest workers, for their part, work mainly in the formal sector, where labor contracts are more rigid and expanding one's labor supply is more difficult.
As to selling physical assets, no substantial differences among quintiles are apparent.
Unreported results show, however, that while the poor are more likely to sell household appliances, the rich are more likely to sell vehicles and real state. For migration, in contrast, there are some large differences among quintiles: poorer households, especially those from the second quintile, are more likely to migrate in the face on adverse income shock. The reasons are again not at all clear, but one can argue that the poor need a smaller push to leave their countries, if only because they have much less to lose.
Conclusions
This paper studies household responses to adverse income shocks in times of crisis. It is shown, first, that households respond to income shocks mainly by increasing their labor force participation, by selling assets, and by disinvesting in human capital. It is also
shown that poor households are most likely to be affected by adverse income shocks.
And finally it is shown that poor (but not the poorest) households are more prone to cut back human capital investments migrate abroad in the face of an adverse income shock. 
